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THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT’S SIDE EFFECTS: 
PRECAUTIONS FOR BIOSIMILARS 
Anna B. Laakmann 
          The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (generally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, or “Hatch-
Waxman”) was designed to expedite regulatory approval of generic 
drugs while simultaneously preserving incentives for innovators to 
invest in the research and development of new drugs. While Hatch-
Waxman has undoubtedly achieved its aim of creating a robust generic 
pharmaceuticals market, it has also produced several unanticipated 
consequences. Its changes to the federal regulatory scheme have 
yielded convoluted products liability rules, upsetting the conventional 
notion that the seller of a defective product is liable for harm caused by 
its intended use. In addition, its modifications to patent law have had 
the perverse effects of propagating patents of questionable value and 
encouraging potentially anti-competitive agreements between generic 
and brand name manufacturers.  
          Hatch-Waxman’s emergent repercussions are particularly salient 
in light of the recent passage of the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (BPCIA). The BPCIA, enacted as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, crafted a compromise 
between pioneer and follow-on biologics manufacturers patterned after 
Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory scheme for pharmaceuticals. This Article 
reviews Hatch-Waxman unintended effects, and suggests that they 
should serve as precautionary guideposts for implementation of the 
BPCIA. The FDA and lawmakers should heed these potential pitfalls 
and proactively confront unavoidable tradeoffs between safety, cost, 
and access to therapeutic biologics. 
 
 
 
  Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. J.D., Stanford University; M.D., 
University of Pennsylvania; B.A., Williams College. I wish to thank the staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their invitation to contribute to Volume 47’s symposium issue on 
emerging health law issues, and for their excellent editorial assistance. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 
1984 (generally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, or “Hatch-
Waxman”) structured a compromise between brand name and 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.1 The legislative goal was to 
expedite the approval of generic drugs while simultaneously 
preserving sufficient incentives for innovators to invest in the 
research and development of new drugs.2 Hatch-Waxman made 
several changes to patent law and the federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). It authorized patent term extensions for 
innovative drugs to compensate for patent life lost during premarket 
review by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)3 and created 
FDA-administered exclusivities for new products and indications.4 
Hatch-Waxman also established an abbreviated new drug application 
(ANDA) pathway under which generic manufacturers may rely on 
FDA findings of safety and efficacy for brand name equivalents and 
avoid the expensive process of producing their own clinical trials 
data.5 In addition, it exempted from patent infringement the use of 
patented inventions for research intended to generate information for 
ANDA submission.6 Finally, it created a complex scheme whereby 
generic manufacturers can challenge the validity and scope of brand 
name manufacturers’ patents prior to bringing generic versions to 
market.7 
Generic drug utilization has dramatically increased since  
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 101, 98 Stat. 1538, 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156 (2012)). 
 2. Abbott Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The Act emerged from 
Congress’s efforts to balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce brand name 
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research and develop new drug 
products, while simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of these 
drugs to market.”). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2006) (patent life is extended by a “time equal to the regulatory 
review period for the approved product”); see id. § 156(g)(6)(A) (capping the extension at five 
years). 
 4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006) (five years of data exclusivity for FDA-approved new 
chemical entities (NCEs); Id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii) (three years of data exclusivity for FDA-approved 
new indications requiring submission of clinical data). 
 5. Id. § 355(j). 
 6. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 7. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B). 
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Hatch-Waxman’s enactment. In 2012, generics accounted for 84 
percent of all U.S. prescriptions,8 compared to only 19 percent in 
1984.9 This growth has stemmed in part from Hatch-Waxman’s 
incentives for generic manufacturers to assert that brand name 
patents are either invalid or not infringed by generic versions.10 The 
passage in all fifty states of generic substitution laws, which enable 
pharmacists to fill prescriptions for brand name drugs with their 
generic copies, has further fueled widespread generic adoption.11 
While Hatch-Waxman has undoubtedly achieved its aim of 
producing a robust generic pharmaceuticals market, it has also 
created several unanticipated consequences. Its modifications to the 
federal regulatory scheme have produced convoluted products 
liability rules, upsetting the conventional notion that the seller of a 
defective product is liable for harm caused by its intended use.12 
Additionally, its provisions that are designed to encourage generic 
manufacturers to challenge unexpired patents have had the perverse 
effects of propagating patents of questionable value and encouraging 
potentially anti-competitive agreements between generic and brand 
name manufacturers.13 
Hatch-Waxman’s emergent repercussions are particularly salient 
in light of the recent passage of the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act (BPCIA). The BPCIA, enacted as part of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, crafted a compromise 
between pioneer and follow-on biologics manufacturers patterned 
after Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory scheme for pharmaceuticals.14 
 
 8. Elizabeth Richardson, Health Policy Brief: Biosimilars, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Oct. 10, 
2013, at 2, available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=100. 
 9. Henry Grabowski et al., Implementation of the Biosimilar Pathway: Economic and 
Policy Issues, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 511, 537 (2011). 
 10. C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 614 (2011) (“[T]he prevalence of challenges has risen 
dramatically over the past 25 years, placing them at the center of a vigorous debate about drug 
innovation and access.”); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1567 (2006) (noting that 
nine of the ten best-selling drugs in 2000 attracted pre-expiration patent challenges). 
 11. Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 2014 WL 4055813, at *16 (Ala. Aug. 15, 2014). 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Parts III.A and III.B. 
 14. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 7001–03, 
124 Stat. 119, 804–21 (2010) [hereinafter BPCIA]. Biologics are animal-based large molecules 
typically regulated under the Public Service Act, which contained no provision for an abbreviated 
approval pathway prior to passage of the BPCIA. See 42 U.S.C.A § 262 (2012); Grabowski et al., 
supra note 9, at 512–17. 
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This Article highlights the policy problems spawned by  
Hatch-Waxman and anticipates the challenges that lie ahead with the 
advent of biosimilars.15 
II.  PATIENT SAFETY CONCERNS 
A.  Bioequivalence and Generic Substitution 
In order to use Hatch-Waxman’s ANDA pathway, a generic 
drug manufacturer must show that its product contains the same 
active ingredient(s) as the brand name drug; has the same route of 
administration, dosage form, and strength; and is “bioequivalent.”16 
Bioequivalence is established by showing that the rate and extent of 
absorption of the generic drug into the patient’s bloodstream is 
within 80 percent to 125 percent of that of the brand name drug.17 If 
a generic drug is “therapeutically equivalent” to its brand name 
counterpart, states may permit pharmacists to substitute the generic 
for the brand name drug without authorization from the prescribing 
physician.18 Therapeutic equivalents “can be expected to have the 
same clinical effect and safety profile when administered to patients 
under the conditions specified in the labeling.”19 All fifty states have 
enacted laws that either allow or mandate generic substitution.20 
Pharmacies are encouraged to substitute generics for brand name 
drugs, since they commonly receive higher dispensing fees for 
 
 15. A “biosimilar” is a biologic molecule that closely resembles a biologic product that has 
already been approved by the FDA. The BPCIA authorizes the FDA to approve a biosimilar 
through a streamlined process if there are “no clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of 
safety, purity, and potency” between the reference product and the biosimilar. 42 U.S.C. 
§262(i)(2). See infra Part IV.A. 
 16. Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence: 
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement, 
66 SMU L. REV. 59, 70 (2013). 
 17. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: BIOAVAILABILITY AND 
BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS—GENERIC 
CONSIDERATIONS 20 (2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances 
/ucm070124.pdf. 
 18. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 524. 
 19. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC 
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS vii (2012) [hereinafter Orange Book], available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-public/@fdagov-drugs-gen/documents/document 
/ucm071436.pdf. 
 20. David R. Holmes et al., American College of Cardiology Foundation and American 
Heart Association 2011 Health Policy Statement on Therapeutic Interchange and Substitution, 58 
J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1287, 1305–07 (2011). 
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selling generics than for selling brand name equivalents.21 
Although this practice helps to reduce healthcare costs, it also 
raises safety concerns.22 Contrary to popular perception, generic 
drugs are rarely identical to their brand name counterparts.23 
Generics must contain the same active ingredients as brand name 
drugs, but the FDA permits generic companies to use different 
inactive ingredients.24 “High variability” drugs have absorption rates 
that differ considerably from patient to patient, and small differences 
in the formulations of generic and brand name versions may yield 
clinically significant effects.25 Generic substitution can pose safety 
hazards even in cases that do not involve high variability drugs. For 
example, case evidence suggests that some patients with epilepsy 
suffer more frequent seizures following substitution of brand name 
antiepileptic agents with generic versions.26 Concerns that switching 
between pioneer and generic equivalents could adversely affect 
patients have led some states to exempt certain classes of drugs from 
state substitution laws.27 
B.  Labeling Requirements and the Duty to Warn 
Hatch-Waxman’s expedited approval pathway has created 
thorny regulatory and tort issues with regard to dangers that are 
discovered after generic versions of a brand name drug have entered 
 
 21. HENRY GRABOWSKI, COMPETITION BETWEEN GENERIC AND BRANDED DRUGS, 
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: INCENTIVES, COMPETITION, AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 153, 156 (Frank A. Sloan & Chee-Ruey Hsieh eds., 2007). 
 22. See Peter Meredith, Bioequivalence and Other Unresolved Issues in Generic Drug 
Substitution, 25 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2875, 2875–76 (2003). 
 23. Freilich, supra note 16, at 61; Melinda Beck, Inexact Copies: How Generics Differ from 
Brand Names, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2008, at D1 (reporting that an FDA review found that 
generic Wellbutrin XL reached its maximum blood concentration in about half the time as the 
brand name version, but dismissing this difference as clinically insignificant). 
 24. Freilich, supra note 16, at 81. 
 25. Id. at 72 (noting that the pharmacokinetic parameters of generic and brand name “high 
variability” drugs may differ by more than 10 percent). 
 26. M.J. Berg et al., Generic Substitution in the Treatment of Epilepsy: Case Evidence of 
Breakthrough Seizures, 71 NEUROLOGY 525, 525–30 (2008). See also R. Talati et al., Efficacy 
and Safety of Innovator Versus Generic Drugs in Patients With Epilepsy: A Systematic Review, 
32 PHARMACOTHERAPY 314 (2012) (concluding, based on limited data, that innovator and 
generic antiepileptic agents are equally safe and effective, but that switching from one version to 
the other may be associated with more hospitalizations and longer hospital stays). 
 27. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 15 So. 3d 642, 645–46, 656–57 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Jonathan D. Rockoff, Cost of Medicine Could Increase: Brand-Name 
Drugmakers Target Generic Prescriptions, BALT. SUN, June 17, 2008, at 1A (noting recent laws 
passed in Tennessee and Utah that prohibit the substitution of antiepileptic agents). 
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the market. FDA approval is not a guarantee of safety and efficacy, 
as risks frequently are identified only after widespread use in the 
general patient population.28 To bolster patient safety, the FDA 
mandates post-market surveillance and compels manufacturers to 
establish risk mitigation and evaluation strategies.29 The agency may 
require drug sponsors to perform additional clinical studies in order 
to investigate risks that are discovered after FDA approval.30 It also 
may prescribe labeling changes if it becomes aware of new 
information that must be included in the product’s labeling.31 
FDA labeling regulations impose different post-market 
obligations on brand name and generic manufacturers. These 
differences proved crucial in a series of Supreme Court decisions 
considering the preemptive effects of federal regulatory law on state 
tort claims alleging that drug manufacturers inadequately warned of 
risks that arose after market approval. In 2009, the Court held in 
Wyeth v. Levine32 that federal law did not preempt a claim against a 
brand name drug manufacturer asserting that the label contained an 
inadequate warning about the risks of a particular method of 
administration.33 The Court reasoned that because manufacturers do 
not need FDA preapproval to strengthen the warnings on their labels, 
and there was no evidence that the FDA would have prohibited 
Wyeth from making such a labeling change, it was not impossible for 
Wyeth to satisfy both federal regulatory and state tort duties.34 
But two years later, in PLIVA v. Mensing,35 the Court held that 
federal law did preempt a failure-to-warn claim against a generic 
drug manufacturer.36 The Court explained that the FDA requires that 
a generic drug’s warning always be the same as that on the label of 
its brand name reference product; therefore, a generic manufacturer 
 
 28. Anna B. Laakmann, Collapsing the Distinction Between Experimentation and Treatment 
in the Regulation of New Drugs, 62 ALA L. REV. 305, 327–29 (2011); Lars Noah, Informed 
Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 361, 394 (2002) (“The issuance of a product license does not magically transform an 
investigational medical technology into one that has matured fully and requires no additional 
scrutiny.”). 
 29. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 30. Id. § 355(o)(3). 
 31. Id. § 355(o)(4). 
 32. 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 570–73. 
 35. 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
 36. Id. 
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would violate federal law if it unilaterally made changes to 
strengthen its warning.37 Thus, unlike brand name manufacturers, it 
would be impossible for generic manufacturers to comply with both 
federal sameness requirements and state tort duties mandating 
warnings that are stronger than those listed in the FDA-approved 
generic label.38 
In 2013, the Supreme Court extended the scope of generic 
manufacturers’ protection from tort liability by holding that federal 
law also preempted claims that generic drugs were defectively 
designed.39 The Court reasoned that federal regulations forbade a 
generic manufacturer both from changing the chemical composition 
of its drug’s active ingredients and from independently revising its 
warning label; therefore, impossibility preemption applied.40 The 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the generic manufacturer 
could have complied with both federal regulatory and state tort law 
by simply withdrawing its product from the market.41 
Can patients who are harmed by generic drugs sue the 
manufacturer of the brand name reference product? The majority of 
courts that have grappled with this question have adopted the Fourth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Foster v. American Home Products Corp.42 to 
conclude that they cannot.43 In Foster, the plaintiffs’ daughter died 
after taking a generic form of the brand name drug Phenergan.44 
They sued the manufacturer of Phenergan, asserting negligent 
misrepresentation and strict liability.45 The federal district court 
dismissed the strict liability claim because the brand name firm had 
not manufactured the product that had allegedly caused the injury.46 
The district court allowed the negligence claim to proceed, but the 
Fourth Circuit reversed this decision.47 Applying Maryland law, the 
appeals court reasoned that the brand name manufacturer did not owe 
 
 37. Id. at 2574–75. 
 38. Id. at 2577–78. 
 39. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
 40. Id. at 2473–77. 
 41. Id. at 2478 (rejecting the First Circuit’s “stop-selling rationale” for why impossibility 
preemption should not apply). 
 42. Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 43. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 613 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting that the 
“overwhelming majority” of courts considering the issue have followed Foster). 
 44. Foster, 29 F.3d at 166. 
 45. Id. at 167. 
 46. Id. at 166–67. 
 47. Id. at 171–72. 
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a duty to the user of a generic version of its drug, even if it was 
foreseeable to the brand name manufacturer that statements 
contained in its label could result in injury to the generic user.48 
Conte v. Wyeth49 is a notable exception to the prevailing view 
that a person who is harmed by a generic drug cannot assert a 
negligent misrepresentation claim against the brand name 
manufacturer.50 The California Court of Appeals reasoned that brand 
name firms owe a duty to all persons whose physicians foreseeably 
rely on the information contained in their product labels, including 
those who take generic versions of the prescribed drug.51 Citing FDA 
bioequivalence requirements and state substitution laws, the court 
concluded that it was foreseeable as a matter of law that a 
prescription for a generic version of Wyeth’s drug Reglan would be 
filled in reliance on the information disclosed in Reglan’s label.52 
The court rejected Wyeth’s argument that it is unfair to hold brand 
name manufacturers liable for injuries caused by their generic 
competitors’ drugs, given that innovators bear the costly burden of 
generating information for FDA approval “while generic 
manufacturers merely ‘rid[e their] coattails.’”53 
Although Conte represents the minority view,54 the Supreme 
Court’s recent preemption jurisprudence might compel more courts 
to entertain negligent misrepresentation claims against brand name 
manufacturers for harms caused by generic drugs. Since compliance 
with FDA sameness requirements essentially immunizes generic 
 
 48. Id. at 171. 
 49. 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008). 
 50. Id. at 94–95. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 105 (“In California, as in most states, pharmacists have long been authorized by 
statute to fill prescriptions for name-brand drugs with their generic equivalents unless the 
prescribing physician expressly forbids such a substitution . . . . [I]t is also eminently foreseeable 
that a physician might prescribe generic metoclopramide in reliance on Wyeth’s representations 
about Reglan.”). 
 53. Id. at 109. 
 54. Two other courts have followed Conte. See Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 (D. 
Vt. 2010) (holding that a brand name manufacturer had a duty to use due care in disseminating 
information about its drug and that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the 
plaintiff’s physicians relied upon information provided by the brand name manufacturer when 
they prescribed generic versions of the drug); Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 2014 WL 4055813, at *16 
(Ala. Aug. 15, 2014) (rejecting Foster’s holding that a plaintiff harmed by a generic drug is 
barred from asserting a tort claim against the brand name manufacturer and noting that “[t]he 
Foster court’s finding that manufacturers of generic drugs are responsible for the representations 
they make in their labeling regarding their products is flawed based on the ‘sameness’ 
requirement discussed in PLIVA”).  
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manufacturers from tort liability,55 the brand name manufacturer may 
be the only possible defendant that can be sued by a patient harmed 
by a generic drug. Courts that wish to ensure that such plaintiffs have 
a viable avenue of relief might be inclined to adopt Conte’s view of 
innovator liability. Such an approach would advance compensatory 
goals, but could further dampen the incentives to create new drugs 
and thus reduce overall patient welfare. 
In November 2013, the FDA proposed a rule that would mitigate 
the differential impact of the Supreme Court’s preemption 
jurisprudence on tort claims against brand name and generic 
manufacturers.56 The proposed rule would permit ANDA holders, 
like brand name manufacturers, to change their labels in response to 
new risk information without obtaining FDA preapproval.57 
Impossibility preemption presumably would no longer apply to 
claims against generic manufacturers if the FDA were to authorize 
generic firms to unilaterally update their labels in response to newly 
discovered harms. But the patient protection and victim 
compensation objectives furthered by such changes would come at a 
steep price. Generic manufacturers are able to offer low-cost drugs 
precisely because they are not obligated to generate, aggregate, and 
analyze safety and efficacy data about their products, as innovators 
are required to do.58 If federal regulations and tort law were to 
change in ways that compel generic manufacturers to do more in the 
post-market phase, the cost to sell generic pharmaceuticals would 
increase and drug prices would correspondingly rise. Moreover, the 
benefits of uniformity might be lost if the warnings on generic labels 
 
 55. Generic manufacturers may still be held liable for failing to timely update their drug 
labels in response to labeling changes made by the brand name reference product sponsor. See, 
e.g., In re Fosamax Products Liab. Litig., 965 F. Supp. 2d 413, 416–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding 
that “failure to update” claims against the Generic Defendants were not preempted). 
 56. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes For Approved Drugs and 
Biological Products, 78 Fed. Reg. 67985-02 (proposed Nov. 13, 2013) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R. pt. 314 and 601). 
 57. Id. See also Katie Thomas, Label Updates May Be Allowed For Generics, N.Y TIMES, 
Nov. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/business/fda-proposes-letting-generic-drug-
companies-alter-labels.html?_r=0 (including a statement by a representative of the trade group for 
the generics industry questioning whether the FDA has statutory authority to promulgate this 
regulation). 
 58. Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 266, 281 (2011) 
(noting that, unlike generic manufacturers, brand name manufacturers provide education, safety 
and efficacy data, and other social benefits). 
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were no longer required at all times to be identical to those of brand 
name drugs. Variations in the warning labels for brand name and 
generic versions of a drug would undermine the concept of a truly 
generic market. This could hamper the operation of state substitution 
laws, create patient and prescriber confusion, and exacerbate safety 
concerns. 
III.  PATENT COMPLICATIONS 
A.  Evergreening and Inventing Around 
Manufacturers of new chemical entities (NCEs) list the patents 
covering their products in an FDA compendium commonly known as 
the Orange Book.59 Generic manufacturers filing ANDAs must 
certify either: (i) that the NCE they wish to imitate is not covered by 
a patent; (ii) that any such listed patents have expired; (iii) that any 
such listed patents will have expired by the time the generic plans to 
enter the market; or (iv) that any such listed patents are invalid, not 
infringed by the generic product, or both.60 These elections, known 
as paragraph I, II, III, and IV certifications respectively, give both 
the FDA and the brand name manufacturer notice of the ANDA 
applicant’s intent.61 The first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV 
certification is eligible to receive 180 days of market exclusivity as 
the only generic manufacturer of the reference drug.62 
In patent infringement cases that arise from a paragraph IV 
certification, courts must consider the legal relevance of the generic 
manufacturer’s assertion to the FDA that its product is bioequivalent 
to the brand name version. In Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc.,63 
the Federal Circuit explained that bioequivalency and patent 
infringement are two distinct concepts. While bioequivalency is a 
medical and regulatory matter for the FDA, patent infringement is a 
legal issue that turns on comparative analysis of the claim elements 
and the accused product.64 The upshot is that a generic drug can be 
 
 59. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 10, at 618. 
 60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006). 
 61. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug 
Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189–90 (1999). 
 62. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006). 
 63. 566 F.3d 1282, 1296–98 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 64. Id. at 1298 (“Bioequivalency is a regulatory and medical concern aimed at establishing 
that two compounds are effectively the same for pharmaceutical purposes. In contrast, 
equivalency for purposes of patent infringement requires an element-by-element comparison of 
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bioequivalent but not infringing. This means that some generic drugs 
can enter the market prior to the expiration of a valid patent covering 
a brand name drug.65 
Patentees who sue generic manufacturers must show either 
literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents 
(DOE).66 Literal infringement requires a showing that the accused 
product incorporates each and every element of the patent claim.67 
Absent literal infringement, patentees may successfully establish 
infringement under the DOE if the accused product “performs the 
same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially 
the same result” as the patented invention.68 Equivalence must be 
assessed on an element-by-element basis, rather than by comparing 
the claimed invention and the accused product holistically.69 This 
element-by-element approach aims to preserve claims’ boundary-
defining function and to avoid unduly enlarging the scope of the 
patent.70 
Hatch-Waxman’s patent provisions have engendered a complex 
game of cat and mouse between pioneer and generic manufacturers. 
Generic versions of brand name drugs may enter the market when 
patents covering the reference product’s active ingredients expire or 
are invalidated.71 But pioneer firms typically develop patent 
portfolios for their commercial products that cover more than the 
active ingredients.72 Through a process known as “evergreening,” 
brand name manufacturers obtain secondary patents on incremental 
improvements to their products and then add those patents to the 
Orange Book listing for their licensed drugs.73 In addition to core 
 
the patent claim and the accused product, requiring not only equivalent function but also 
equivalent way and result.”). 
 65. See id. (“‘If bioequivalency meant per se infringement, no alternative to a patented 
medicine could ever be offered to the public during the life of a patent.’” (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D.Ill.2007))). 
 66. Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1737, 1762–63 (2011). 
 67. Id. at 1773–74. 
 68. Dawn Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 69. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997). 
 70. See Surden, supra note 66, at 1773–74. 
 71. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 231–32 (2001). 
 72. Gideon Parchomovksy & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–6, 
16–17 (2005). 
 73. Freilich, supra note 16, at 104. 
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patents covering the active ingredients, brand name manufacturers 
retain peripheral patents covering purity, stability, formulation, 
chemical synthesis, and methods of use.74 The number of sequential 
pharmaceutical patents has skyrocketed since the passage of Hatch-
Waxman.75 This reflects a strategic response by brand name 
manufacturers to counteract the effects of robust generic competition 
resulting from its enactment. 
In order to avoid these weaker follow-on patents, generic 
companies frequently seek to introduce products that differ slightly 
from the brand name versions.76 Patent infringement cases involving 
peripheral patents often turn on whether the generic manufacturer 
has distinguished its product enough to avoid infringement under the 
DOE.77 ANDA applicants are thus motivated to modify their 
products as much as they can without running afoul of the FDA’s 
sameness requirements.78 Contrary to their depiction as copycats that 
simply manufacture identical versions of brand name drugs and sell 
them at lower prices, generic manufacturers are thus encouraged by 
an amalgam of regulatory and patent hurdles to engage in their own 
forms of innovation.79 While such innovation by generic 
manufacturers can yield social benefits, it also exacerbates patient 
safety concerns.80 For example, generic manufacturers might 
deliberately increase levels of impurities in their products in order to 
avoid infringement.81 Since safety is not a relevant consideration in 
patent infringement cases, generic manufacturers have perverse 
 
 74. Id. at 103. 
 75. Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 10, at 619–20. 
 76. Freilich, supra note 16, at 61–62. 
 77. See id. at 103 (explaining that DOE cases typically involve peripheral patents, as core 
patents frequently expire before the brand name drug gets to market). 
 78. Id. at 80 (noting that this set of incentives creates a paradox whereby “patent law 
requires generic companies to innovate a certain distance from the bounds of the patent, but FDA 
regulations require generic companies to remain close to the brand name product”). 
 79. Id. at 107. 
 80. The safety of generic pharmaceuticals is a particular concern in light of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2569 (2011) (holding that  
failure-to-warn claims against generic manufacturers under state tort law were preempted by 
federal labeling regulations) and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 
2470 (2013) (holding that design defect claims against generic manufacturers under state tort law 
were preempted by federal law). 
 81. E.g., Sunovion Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 731 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2013); 
Pozen Inc. v. Par Pharm. Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 789, 809–12 (E.D. Tex. 2011); see also EKR 
Therapeutics, Inc. v. Sun Pharm. Indus., 633 F. Supp. 2d 187 (D.N.J. 2009) (offering another 
example of harm that may result when generics deliberately manufacture drugs that differ from 
their brand name counterparts). 
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incentives to expose patients to unnecessary risks.82 
B.  Pay-for-Delay Settlements 
Hatch-Waxman created an incentive for generic manufacturers 
to challenge unexpired drug patents by authorizing 180 days of 
exclusivity for the first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV 
certification.83 This 180-day period could be worth several hundred 
million dollars to an ANDA applicant that successfully challenges 
patents covering the reference product.84 The FDA may not approve 
any other generic version of the innovator’s drug until the exclusivity 
period expires. Since the first paragraph IV filer would be the only 
generic manufacturer of the drug during this time, it can expect to 
share duopoly profits with the brand name firm.85 Importantly, only 
the first generic firm to file a paragraph IV certification is entitled to 
receive this lucrative bounty.86 If multiple generic manufacturers file 
on the same day, they are entitled to share the exclusivity period.87 
Brand name manufacturers have adapted to this regulatory 
scheme by negotiating “pay-for-delay” settlements with paragraph 
IV filers. Under the terms of these settlements, the generic firm 
concedes the validity of the innovator’s patents and agrees not to 
market a competing drug. In exchange, the brand name manufacturer 
pays the generic firm cash or other consideration.88 
While such deals are presumably optimal for the settling parties, 
they can produce negative externalities by undermining Hatch-
Waxman’s pro-competition objectives. When the first paragraph IV 
filer takes litigation to completion and successfully invalidates the 
innovator’s patent, it opens the door to robust generic competition 
 
 82. Freilich, supra note 16, at 109–10 (“It would be better to craft laws that avoid giving 
generic companies perverse incentives to make products less safe.”). 
 83. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012). 
 84. Hemphill, supra note 10, at 1579. 
 85. Id. at 1590. 
 86. Id. at 1560; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii) (stating that upon the first ANDA 
applicant’s forfeiture, no other applicants are eligible for the exclusivity period). 
 87. F.T.C. v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2246 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing amicus 
brief stating that the yearly average number of first-day generic applications between 2002 and 
2008 never dropped below three). 
 88. See, e.g., id. at 2229 (majority opinion) (explaining the terms of a pay-for-delay 
settlement whereby the manufacturer of name brand AndroGel paid several million dollars to 
paragraph IV filers in exchange for their agreement to refrain from bringing generic versions to 
market). 
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upon expiration of the 180-day exclusivity period.89 Settlement 
short-circuits this process. If the first paragraph IV filer refrains from 
challenging the innovator’s patents in exchange for cash or in-kind 
compensation, other generic manufacturers (who are not eligible for 
generic exclusivity) might elect to wait until patent expiration before 
filing their own ANDAs. Pay-for-delay settlements thereby reduce 
consumer surplus by extending the period during which the 
innovator enjoys freedom from competition and associated 
monopoly prices.90 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has long insisted that 
such reverse payment settlement agreements violate antitrust law and 
has challenged numerous agreements as unreasonable restraints of 
trade.91 Noting that courts have differed in their application of the 
antitrust laws to Hatch-Waxman-related patent settlements, the 
Supreme Court recently considered the issue in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, Inc.92 The Court declined to set a categorical 
rule that such agreements are presumptively unlawful, but held that 
the FTC should have the opportunity to challenge pay-for-delay 
agreements on a case-by-case basis under the “rule of reason.”93 It 
reasoned that such settlements are an unintended by-product of 
“Hatch-Waxman’s unique regulatory framework”94 and run counter 
to the statute’s sponsors’ policy goals.95 
The ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision are 
unclear. On one hand, increased FTC scrutiny of reverse payment 
settlements could benefit consumers by spurring generic 
 
 89. See Hemphill, supra note 10, at 1567. 
 90. Id. at 1572–73 (noting that economic modeling shows that consumer welfare is reduced, 
on average, if the paragraph IV filer enters into a pay-for-delay settlement rather than seeing 
patent litigation to completion). 
 91. Duff Wilson, F.T.C. Criticizes Agreements That Delay Generic Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 2011, at B2; see also Editorial, The “Pay for Delay” Rap, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2010, at 
A22 (stating that FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz “has been conducting his campaign with 
evangelical zeal”). 
 92. 133 S. Ct. at 2230 (2013) (observing that some lower courts found such settlements to be 
presumptively lawful while others had found them to be presumptively unlawful). 
 93. Id. at 2236–37. 
 94. Id. at 2235. 
 95. Id. at 2234 (citing 148 Cong. Rec. 14437 (2002); 146 Cong. Rec. 144 (2000) 
(“([R]emarks of Sen. Hatch) (‘It was and is very clear that the [Hatch-Waxman Act] was not 
designed to allow deals between brand and generic companies to delay competition’) . . . 
(remarks of Rep. Waxman) (introducing bill to deter companies from ‘strik[ing] collusive 
agreements to trade multimillion dollar payoffs by the brand company for delays in the 
introduction of lower cost, generic alternatives’).”)). 
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manufacturers to pursue patent challenges rather than agreeing to 
delay market entry.96 On the other hand, greater FTC oversight might 
discourage ANDA applicants from filing paragraph IV challenges in 
the first place, which could have the overall effect of extending the 
life of brand name manufacturers’ patent protection.97 In any event, 
antitrust litigation will be one of Hatch-Waxman’s lingering side 
effects for the indefinite future.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BIOLOGICS 
PRICE COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT 
The BPCIA created an abbreviated approval pathway for  
follow-on biologics modeled after Hatch-Waxman’s scheme for 
generic drugs. The statute authorizes the FDA to approve a 
biosimilar upon expiration of a twelve-year data exclusivity period 
for the corresponding pioneer biologic.98 The biosimilar applicant 
may rely on the FDA’s prior approval of the pioneer’s biologic if 
there are “no clinically meaningful differences . . . in terms of safety, 
purity, and potency” between the pioneer’s reference product and the 
biosimilar.99 If the FDA finds that a biosimilar is sufficiently similar 
to be “interchangeable” with the reference product, the biosimilar 
may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention 
of the prescribing health care provider.100 The first biosimilar found 
to be interchangeable is entitled to an exclusive marketing period 
during which no other product may be deemed interchangeable with 
the same reference product.101 The BPCIA also contains a complex 
 
 96. See id. (“Continued litigation, if it results in patent invalidation or a finding of 
noninfringement, could cost the patentee $500 million in lost revenues, a sum that then would 
flow in large part to consumers in the form of lower prices.”). 
 97. Id. at 2247 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“The irony of all this is that the majority’s decision 
may very well discourage generics from challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first place . . . . 
Taking the prospect of settlements off the table—or limiting settlements to an earlier entry date 
for the generic, which may still be many years in the future—puts a damper on the generic’s 
expected value going into litigation, and decreases its incentives to sue in the first place.”). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(A) (2012). An additional six months of exclusivity is available for 
the reference innovative biologic if pediatric study requirements are met. Id. § 262 (m)(2). The 
innovator cannot extend the exclusivity period by making minor changes to its product and filing 
a supplemental or subsequent application. See id. § 262(k)(7)(C) (listing modifications for which 
the exclusivity period does not apply). 
 99. Id. § 262(i)(2). 
 100. Id. § 262(i)(3). 
 101. Id. § 262(k)(6). Exclusivity extends until the earliest of: one year after the first 
commercial marketing of the first-approved interchangeable biosimilar; eighteen months after a 
final court decision or the dismissal of a patent infringement suit against the first interchangeable 
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set of patent-related provisions that require private information 
exchanges among the biosimilar applicant, the reference product 
sponsor, and patent holders.102 
A.  Defining Similarity and Interchangeability 
The BPCIA gives the FDA broad discretion to determine 
biosimilarity and interchangeability. Evidence to support 
biosimilarity may include analytical, animal-based, and clinical 
studies, but the FDA may waive the need for these data in any given 
case.103 The FDA has authority to designate a biosimilar 
interchangeable if it finds that the biosimilar “can be expected to 
produce the same clinical result as the reference product in any given 
patient,” and repeated administration of the drug will not reduce its 
efficacy or increase its toxicity beyond what is expected from the 
reference biologic.104 
The agency faces a daunting task in making these 
determinations because biologics typically are more complex 
molecules than small-molecule chemical drugs. They are produced 
using biological processes rather than chemical syntheses, which 
means that small manufacturing deviations can significantly alter a 
product’s safety and efficacy.105 While generic small-molecule drugs 
sometimes manifest unexpected clinical effects,106 biosimilars 
present an exceedingly more complicated set of scientific 
considerations.107 One particular danger that may result from subtle 
differences between seemingly interchangeable biologics is increased 
immunogenicity, which occurs when a patient’s immune system 
 
biosimilar; forty-two months after the approval of the first interchangeable biologic if patent 
litigation is still ongoing; or eighteen months after the approval of the first interchangeable 
biosimilar if the applicant has not been sued. Id. 
 102. Id. § 262(l). 
 103. Id. § 262(k)(2)(A). 
 104. Id. U.S.C. § 262(k)(4)(A). 
 105. Henry Grabowski et al., The Market for Follow-on Biologics: How Will it Evolve?, 25 
HEALTH AFFS. 1291, 1291–1301 (2006). 
 106. See supra Part II.A. 
 107. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Health and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 110th 
Cong. 22 (2007) (statement of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Deputy Comm’r, Chief Medical Officer, 
FDA), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm154017.htm (noting that the 
idea of sameness used in the generic small-molecule approval process usually will not be 
appropriate in the biologics context). 
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develops antibodies to protein-based drugs.108  
The FDA’s limited experience reviewing the safety and efficacy 
of follow-on protein products presages the issues that it will face 
under the BPCIA. Section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA permits an 
applicant to file a new drug application that relies on clinical 
investigations that were not sponsored by the applicant and for which 
the applicant lacks a right of reference or use.109 This provision 
authorizes streamlined review of products that do not meet the 
sameness requirements for generic drug approval and thus cannot be 
approved through the ANDA pathway.110 The FDA has used the 
section 505(b)(2) provision to approve some second-generation 
biologics, including recombinant versions of human growth hormone 
and the enzyme hyaluronidase.111 In these cases, the agency required 
the applicant to generate its own clinical data in addition to relying 
on publicly available information.112 Notably, while the FDA has 
approved several follow-on protein products, the agency has never 
found one to be therapeutically equivalent to (and thus substitutable 
with) a reference product.113 
The amount of evidence that the FDA requires to establish 
similarity and interchangeability will dictate the contours of the 
biosimilars market.114 These determinations implicate inevitable 
cost-quality tradeoffs. The more robust the data to support safety and 
efficacy, the more confidence patients, physicians, and payers will 
 
 108. Trevor Woodage, Blinded by (a Lack of) Science: Limitations in Determining 
Therapeutic Equivalence of Follow-On Biologics and Barriers to Their Approval and 
Commercialization, 9 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012); see also Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics 
Price Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation Must Come Before Price Competition, B.C. 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., 2009, at 3 (describing how a biosimilar erythropoietin drug sold in 
Europe triggered an unexpected immune response in patients that exacerbated their preexisting 
anemia). 
 109. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(2012). 
 110. Krista Hessler Carver et al., An Unofficial Legislative History of the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 679 (2010). 
 111. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Health and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra 
note 107. The FDA used the ANDA provisions to approve a generic version of the hormone 
Pergonal in 1997. Carver et al., supra note 110, at 685–86. Although this approval withstood a 
legal challenge when the D.C. Circuit deferred to the FDA’s decision, the agency has not since 
approved an ANDA for a therapeutic protein product. Id. at 686. 
 112. Assessing the Impact of a Safe and Equitable Biosimilar Policy in the United States: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcommittee on Health and H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, supra 
note 107. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
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have in biosimilar drugs and the wider their adoption will be.115 But 
data generation is expensive, and if the bar for approval is set high, 
the envisioned cost savings from a biosimilars market will fail to 
materialize.116 
Undoubtedly, biosimilars producers will face much higher  
start-up and manufacturing costs than generic drug companies.117 
Firms may be unwilling or unable to obtain interchangeability status, 
given current uncertainty about applicable standards and the 
feasibility of achieving them.118 If a biosimilar is not deemed 
interchangeable, its manufacturer will need to advertise to promote 
its use, which will further drive up costs and prices.119 In sum, 
scientific and regulatory complexity will likely prevent biosimilars 
from causing the same downward price pressure on the biologics 
market that generic drugs exerted on the pharmaceuticals market 
following Hatch-Waxman’s passage. The amount of price 
competition that does result will be a function of the FDA’s 
willingness to permit the free exchange of related, but not identical 
biologics.120 
B.  Interplay Between Federal and State Regulation 
Along with federal regulators, state lawmakers face cost and 
safety tradeoffs in considering the substitutability of biosimilars.121 
Existing state statutes regulating generic drug substitution are 
 
 115. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 517. 
 116. See id. at 522 (citing cost estimates for developing complex biosimilars of $100 to $150 
million, compared to $1 to $2 million for completing bioequivalence studies for generic drugs); 
Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 
57, 80 (2012) (noting that empirical data on the impact of generic entry on drug prices suggests 
that consumers will not obtain significant cost savings unless multiple biosimilars are developed 
to compete with the same brand name biologic).  
 117. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 538–39. 
 118. In 2005, the European Union passed legislation that adopted the concept of a “similar 
biological medicinal product.” What You Need to Know About Biosimilar Medicinal Products, 
European Commission, (2013), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/healthcare 
/files/docs/biosimilars_report_en.pdf. Each member country may set its own rules regarding 
substitution of biosimilars. Currently no country authorizes the substitution of biologics made by 
different manufacturers and some EU Member States have expressly banned this practice. 
Possibility of Substitution of Biosimilars in Europe, GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE 
(June 14, 2013), http://gabionline.net/reports/possibility-of-substitution-of-biosimilars-in-Europe. 
 119. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4. 
 120. See generally id. (discussing the interchangeability of biosimilars and how that will 
affect pricing). 
 121. Kanter & Feldman, supra note 116, 73–74. 
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inapplicable to biosimilars.122 For example, section 4073 of the 
California Business and Professions Code permits substitution of 
drugs with the “same active chemical ingredients,” a restrictive 
standard that interchangeable biosimilars will be unable to meet.123 
In anticipation of FDA guidance on interchangeability standards, 
several states are considering legislation governing biosimilar 
substitution.124 Pioneers, follow-on developers, pharmacist 
associations, health insurers, and other interested parties are intensely 
lobbying state officials on proposed legislation.125 The principal 
contested issue is whether pharmacists will be required to notify 
patients and prescribing physicians before substituting a pioneer’s 
biologic with an interchangeable biosimilar.126 
In contrast to existing generic drug substitution laws, most of the 
draft bills require physician notification when a pharmacist 
substitutes a brand name biologic with an interchangeable 
biosimilar.127 As of October 2013, only five such bills had passed, 
and none had been signed into law.128 Three of the bills include 
sunset provisions that are likely to expire before the FDA approves 
the first biosimilar.129 California Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a bill 
that would have required prescriber notification of biosimilar 
substitution, concluding that it was premature to enact state 
legislation before the FDA established interchangeability 
standards.130 The state-level battle between pioneers and biosimilars 
firms will likely escalate as the FDA specifies the hurdles that must 
be cleared to attain interchangeable status. 
Additional contentious issues relate to the identification and 
labeling of biosimilars.131 A key unresolved question is whether 
 
 122. Id. at 74. 
 123. Id. at 74 (explaining why state generic substitution laws must be adapted for biosimilars). 
 124. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4. 
 125. See id. 
 126. Kurt R. Karst, The Biosimilars State Legislation Scorecard, FDA LAW BLOG 
(Sep. 4, 2013), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/09/biosimilars 
-state-legislation-scorecard.html. 
 127. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Letter from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Cal. State Governor, to the Members of the California 
State Senate (Oct. 12, 2013), available at http://www.gphaonline.org/media/cms/SB_598_2013 
_Veto_Message.pdf. 
 131. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DOCKET NO. 
FDA-2010-N-0477, APPROVAL PATHWAY FOR BIOSIMILAR AND INTERCHANGEABLE 
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interchangeable biosimilars, like generic drugs, will receive the same 
official (i.e., non-trademarked) name as their reference products. 
Pioneer firms have argued that interchangeable biosimilars should 
have unique names, which would enhance patient safety by 
facilitating adverse event monitoring.132 Biosimilar firms and 
pharmacist associations counter that unique names could lead to 
duplicative prescribing of highly similar products and would create 
unnecessary consumer and prescriber confusion.133 
A bipartisan group of U.S. Senators recently sent a letter to the 
FDA noting: “In crafting the BPCIA, the intent of Congress was to 
create a safe and competitive marketplace for biosimilars, akin to the 
marketplace for generic drugs.”134 The letter expressed concern that 
requiring different names for biosimilars would undermine that goal 
by discouraging substitution and inflating healthcare costs.135 Yet, 
the FDA must strike a delicate balance between fostering 
competition between comparable biologics and ensuring that 
patients, physicians, and payers have clear and accurate information 
that enables them to make informed choices. Patient safety concerns 
might dictate unique names and distinctive labeling for some 
biosimilars. 
The FDA faces additional policy decisions regarding the 
regulation of risk information acquired after biosimilars enter the 
market. The BPCIA states that biosimilars manufacturers must 
comply with FDA post-market requirements.136 But it remains to be 
seen how the FDA will formulate risk evaluation and mitigation 
strategies for biosimilars. If the agency treats biosimilars like generic 
 
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS; PUBLIC HEARING; REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 64–101 (2010) (noting the 
need to distinguish among the reference product, related biological products that have not been 
shown to be biosimilar, biosimilar products, and interchangeable products). 
 132. Richardson, supra note 8, at 4.  
 133. Id. The Generic Pharmaceutical Association recently filed a citizen’s petition with the 
FDA requesting that all biosimilars approved by the FDA use the international non-proprietary 
name (INN) of their reference products because by definition biosimilars have no clinically 
meaningful differences. Generic Industry Calls on FDA to Uphold Consistent, Proven 
International Standard for Biosimilar Naming, GENERIC PHARM. ASS’N (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://www.gphaonline.org/gpha-media/press/generic-industry-calls-on-fda-to-uphold-consistent 
-proven-international-standard-for-biosimilar-naming. 
 134. Ed Silverman, Senators to FDA: Has Biosimilar Naming Policy Changed?, 
PHARMALIVE (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.pharmalive.com/senators-to-fda-has-biosimliar-
naming-policy-changed. 
 135. Id. 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(D). 
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drugs and stresses the need for sameness between innovative and 
follow-on biologics with respect to both product composition and 
labeling, the agency may be reluctant to impose individualized 
requirements on biosimilars manufacturers. On the other hand, real 
differences among brand name and follow-on protein products might 
compel a more tailored regulatory approach. The more particularized 
the regulation of biosimilars firms, the farther the industry will stray 
from a “generic” market for biologics. 
Federal labeling requirements will determine the viability of 
products liability claims against biosimilar manufacturers. If the 
FDA permits biosimilar producers to unilaterally change their labels 
in response to risk information discovered after market approval, 
then federal law would not preempt state tort claims.137 However, if 
the FDA compels biosimilars firms to maintain warnings that are 
identical to those of interchangeable brand name biologics, then 
impossibility preemption presumably would foreclose failure-to-
warn claims.138 Patients who take biosimilars would enjoy lower  
up-front costs but at the risk of uncompensated harm.139 
C.  Balancing Competition and Innovation 
Hatch-Waxman’s unintended effects on competition and 
innovation highlight potential pitfalls that could emerge under the 
biosimilars regime.140 Unlike generic drug firms, the first biosimilar 
manufacturer to successfully challenge an innovator’s patent does 
not receive a 180-day exclusivity period.141 Hence, we may not see 
the same type of pay-for-delay settlements that arose in response to 
Hatch-Waxman. However, the first biosimilar deemed to be 
interchangeable with a reference product enjoys a period of 
exclusivity whose length depends on when the biosimilar enters the 
market and whether the biosimilar manufacturer is sued for patent 
infringement.142 In addition, biosimilars applicants must disclose 
 
 137. See supra Part II.B.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See Morris, supra note 58, at 281 (discussing how generic drugs are cheaper than the 
name brand drug). 
 140. See supra Part II. 
 141. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 515. 
 142. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(6) (2012). Exclusivity extends until the earliest of: one year after the 
first commercial marketing of the first-approved interchangeable biosimilar; eighteen months 
after a final court decision or the dismissal of a suit against the first interchangeable biosimilar; 
forty-two months after the approval of the first interchangeable biologic if patent litigation is still 
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confidential information to reference product sponsors and patent 
holders for the purpose of identifying patent infringement claims and 
anticipating litigation.143 These BPCIA provisions create 
opportunities for strategic behavior among pioneers and follow-on 
developers. 
Under the BPCIA, a biosimilar application can be filed four 
years after the license date of the reference product.144 The filing of a 
biosimilar application triggers a series of mandatory information 
exchanges between the biosimilar applicant, the reference product 
sponsor, and patent holders.145 Like an ANDA, the submission of a 
biosimilar application constitutes an artificial act of infringement on 
any patent covering the reference product.146 Since the BPCIA does 
not contemplate the creation of an Orange Book for biologics, the 
parties must cooperate to identify whether a patent infringement 
claim could reasonably be asserted against the biosimilar 
applicant.147 This requires the applicant to disclose confidential 
information to both the reference product sponsor and the owner of a 
patent exclusively licensed to the reference product sponsor.148 The 
pioneer receives the benefit of the ability to litigate patent 
infringement issues before biosimilar market entry in exchange for 
the losses it incurs from the biosimilar applicant’s use of its safety 
and potency data.149 
Since biosimilars will differ somewhat from their brand name 
counterparts, follow-on developers may be able to circumvent 
pioneers’ patents.150 Pioneer firms have noted that patent protection 
 
ongoing; or eighteen months after the approval of the first interchangeable biosimilar if the 
applicant has not been sued. Id. 
 143. Id. § 262(l)(1). 
 144. Id. § 262(k)(7)(B). 
 145. Id. § 262(l). 
 146. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(C) (2012). 
 147. See id. § 262(l)(7)(B) (2012). 
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 262(l)(7)(B) (2012). 
 149. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets and Patents under 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 319 
(2011) (“The two parts of the statute (i.e., those provisions allowing the biosimilar applicant to 
rely on FDA’s prior finding of safety, purity, and potency for the reference product and those 
provisions allowing the pioneer to enforce its patents prior to biosimilar market entry) are 
dependent on each other. Both are essential pieces of an elaborate statutory bargain.”). 
 150. Bruce S. Manheim, Jr. et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensuring Continued Innovation in 
the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFFS. 394, 398–400 (2006) (noting that biologics patents 
are often narrower in scope than those covering small-molecule drugs and thus at greater risk of 
being successfully challenged or evaded). 
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is narrower for biologics than for pharmaceuticals, which enables 
imitators to more easily design around biologic patents.151 Hence, 
biosimilars manufacturers might have even more success than 
generic drug companies establishing that their products, though 
similar enough to piggy-back on FDA approval of the pioneer’s 
product, are different enough to avoid patent infringement.152 Such 
efforts to produce follow-on biologics that circumvent pioneers’ 
patent claims yet receive the benefits of abbreviated FDA review, 
could exacerbate patient safety concerns. 
The twelve-year data-exclusivity period for novel biologics may 
partly insure pioneer manufacturers against the risk that their patents 
fail to ward off follow-on competition.153 But if FDA-administered 
exclusivities prove to be insufficient incentives,154 pioneer biologics 
manufacturers will be spurred to ramp up patent evergreening 
strategies in the same way that small-molecule pharmaceutical 
manufacturers responded to the competitive threats created by  
Hatch-Waxman.155 This may lead to an increase in sequential 
biologics patents, which could be a drag on innovation.156 
A biosimilar manufacturer seeking to avoid a pioneer’s  
twelve-year exclusivity period or wary of the information-forcing 
provisions of the BPCIA may prefer to file a full biologics license 
application (BLA) rather than pursue the streamlined approval 
pathway.157 If the biosimilar manufacturer takes this approach, it 
 
 151. See BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG., A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME WITHOUT STRONG 
DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 2–3 (2007), available 
at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/FOBSData_exclusivity_20070926_0.pdf. 
 152. See Manheim et al., supra note 150, at 401; Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data Exclusivity 
Make Biologic Patents Passe?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 249, 276 (2012) 
(noting the “sweet spot” in which “a biologic is similar enough for accelerated approval, but not 
identical for purposes of patent infringement”). 
 153. Grabowski et al., supra note 9, at 551. See also Roth, supra note 152, at 252 (arguing 
that the BPCIA did not create new data exclusivity protection, but rather shortened what had been 
“continuous data exclusivity” to twelve years). 
 154. Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between 
Innovation and Competition, 7 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 486 (2008) (concluding that a 
representative portfolio of new biologic candidates would be expected to recoup R&D costs 
between 12.9 and 16.2 years after launch). But see FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH 
CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION iii–vi (2009), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P083901biologicsreport.pdf (asserting that patents and early-mover 
competitive advantages should be sufficient incentives to encourage biologic innovation). 
 155. See supra Part II.B. 
 156. See Grabowski, supra note 9, at 551. 
 157. See Sandoz Will Steer Clear of U.S. Biosimilars Pathway, Use Other Applications, PINK 
SHEET, May 3, 2010, available at http://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/the-pink-sheet 
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cannot rely on the FDA’s prior approval of the pioneer’s biologic 
and must generate its own data demonstrating its product’s safety, 
purity, and potency.158 But commentators have expressed concern 
that the FDA will enable biosimilars firms to enjoy the best of both 
worlds by approving “skinny BLAs.”159 The worry is that the FDA 
will accept a follow-on developer’s application as a traditional BLA, 
even though the application lacks comprehensive clinical data and 
more closely resembles an abbreviated biosimilar application.160 
While not admitting it, the FDA could rely on its prior finding that 
the pioneer’s biologic is safe, pure, and potent and allow the 
biosimilar applicant to market its product immediately, without the 
restraints delineated in the BPCIA.161 Such practice would raise 
constitutional concerns, as arguably it would amount to a taking of 
the pioneer’s trade secrets without compensation.162 It also could 
upset the BPCIA’s designed balance between competition and 
innovation. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Though the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted thirty years ago, 
several latent side effects have recently surfaced. These 
complications highlight unresolved tensions between the goals of 
promoting innovation, ensuring pharmaceutical quality, and 
stabilizing healthcare costs. Hatch-Waxman’s focus on premarket 
drug approval left unanswered questions about the regulation of risks 
that arise after generics enter the market. In addition, its drafters 
failed to fully anticipate the complex set of incentives created by the 
Act’s patent and exclusivity provisions. Hatch-Waxman’s 
unintended consequences serve as precautionary guideposts for 
implementation of a biosimilars regulatory approval pathway. The 
FDA and lawmakers should heed these potential pitfalls and 
proactively confront unavoidable tradeoffs between safety, cost, and 
access to therapeutic biologics. 
 
/72/018/sandoz-will-steer-clear-of-us-biosimilars-pathway-use-other-applications (reporting that 
some companies have indicated that they will opt not to use the biosimilars pathway in order to 
avoid the BPCIA’s information-sharing provisions). 
 158. Epstein, supra note 149, at 325. 
 159. Id. at 325–26. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 326. 
 162. Id. at 326–27. 
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